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RESPONSE
THE IMPOTENCE OF DELAWARE’S TAXES: A RESPONSE TO
BARZUZA’S DELAWARE’S COMPENSATION
M. Todd Henderson *

P

ERHAPS the most hackneyed and intractable debate in all of
business law concerns the question of whether Delaware has
incentives to provide an optimal corporate law, whatever that is. The
world seems divided into the race-to-the-topers and the race-to-thebottomers, with increasing amounts of scholarship piling up on both
sides, none of which seems to be convincing the other side or moving
policy forward in a meaningful way. 1 When asked to respond to the
latest salvo in this battle, I feared more of the same. But after reading
Professor Michal Barzuza’s thought-provoking article, Delaware’s
Compensation, 2 I am convinced that there are still interesting things to
be said about the optimality of the state-as-competitor-for-charters
model of modern American corporate governance. I do not find
Professor Barzuza’s proposal for making the franchise tax proportional
to firm value convincing or necessarily desirable, but, because of the
natural check provided by state competition, it is unlikely to do much
harm.

* Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School.

1
See M. Todd Henderson, Two Visions of Corporate Law, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1328343.
2
Michal Barzuza, Delaware’s Compensation, 94 Va. L. Rev. 521 (2008).
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Professor Barzuza articulates her thesis as follows:
If Delaware’s [franchise] tax were more sensitive to firm value, or if
Delaware increased its tax to reflect changes in the quality of its law,
the state would have better incentives to invest in quality, even in the
absence of competition, because Delaware would be rewarded for
such changes with higher tax collections. 3

The idea is that the current system of franchise taxation—basically a
flat fee of $165,000 for large firms—does not provide legislators with
sufficient incentives to overcome the ability of managers to lobby for
management-friendly legislation. Professor Barzuza claims that
managers dominate the process of incorporation (both at the IPO and
reincorporation stages), and that legislators rationally favor them over
shareholders, in part because the benefits from favoring managers are
real and sizable, while increasing shareholder value does little to attract
or keep firms and does not increase the state’s $165,000 take.
Professor Barzuza’s paper makes an important point: taxes are not
only a form of regulation, but also can be an incentive for efficient
regulation. 4 To see this, compare two worlds in which there is a single
legislator who writes the rules for firm governance. In the first, much
like modern-day Delaware, the legislator receives a flat fee from each
firm to spend on public goods; and in the second, much like Professor
Barzuza’s imagined Delaware, the legislator receives a large percentage
of firm profits (say 50%) that the legislator can dole out to constituents.
All else being equal, it is obvious that the legislator in the second world
has a stronger incentive to increase firm value, as the benefits flow
directly to the legislator.
It is difficult to object to this claim at a theoretical level, since it may
improve incentives for legislators on the margin, and if the legislators set
the rate too high or enact changes that actually destroy shareholder
value, companies will simply move to Maryland or lobby Delaware to
change back. My guess is, however, that the impact of such a dramatic

3

Id. at 549.
Alternatively, one might think that taxes are a substitute for regulation, since in most
cases regulation decreases firm profitability and taxes are effectively a proxy for government
ownership of a firm. In the case of corporate law, Professor Barzuza claims that regulations
and taxes are compliments, not substitutes, because certain governance regulations increase
firm value rather than lowering it.
4
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change in tax law is likely to be trivial (and potentially harmful for
Delaware) for two reasons. 5
I.
First, Professor Barzuza’s proposal omits any analysis of the
legislative process that a proportional tax is designed to influence. There
are two parts to this, roughly corresponding to the supply and demand of
legislation. Legislators supply legislation, but Professor Barzuza offers
no account of their motives to explain why the increase in state revenues
that would come from a proportional tax would benefit the marginal
Delaware legislator. On the other side of the coin, managers are part of
the demand for corporate legislation, but they too are missing from
Professor Barzuza’s calculus. I consider each in turn.
A.
Professor Barzuza notes that Delaware will be rewarded with higher
taxes and this will encourage it to enact optimal (or more optimal)
legislation. The problem is that Delaware can act only through its
legislators, and these individual legislators are missing from Professor
Barzuza’s account. Without a coherent claim about how legislators
respond to the various incentives created by the parties in the legislative
process, the argument she makes is less persuasive. The point here is
simply that once we move from the single-legislator example above to a
multi-member body, the calculus of weighing the benefits from a change
in corporate governance is more complex. For example, do legislators
only care about the size of the public fisc? Perhaps for some legislators
sitting on key committees, the ability to pass benefits along to
constituents may help them get reelected, but for others the opposite
may be true. Legislators face constituencies with heterogeneous
preferences, not all of which will view increased state revenues as an
unmitigated positive. Assuming that the utility function of the marginal
legislator rises with increased tax revenues seems, at best, overly
simplistic. Is it not just as likely that legislators in multi-member bodies
might care about maximizing other things, such as their chance at
reelection or their personal influence or prestige? Passing shareholder5
Professor Barzuza admits that the new tax policy would be a radical change when she
claims that the federal government might be needed to force the change on an unwilling
Delaware. Barzuza, supra note 2, at 568.
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wealth-maximizing legislation may have little to no effect on such
considerations.
Legislators who could not (or would not want to) take credit for
increased state revenues would not be influenced by a proportional tax.
One might argue that the state could use the increased cash from
corporate taxes to reduce taxes on other entities, such as individuals. But
this argument needs a theory of why increased taxation of firms relative
to individuals is more efficient. Optimizing the mix of tax funding
sources is a difficult calculation, considering the relative ability of firms
and individuals to evade taxes (say, through structuring, compliance, or
leaving the jurisdiction entirely), the impact on incentives to produce
(that is, the choice between work and consuming leisure), the impact on
other tax burdens (such as federal taxes and sales taxes), and so on.
Substituting corporate taxes for individual taxes might seem desirable,
but it could create unintended consequences or dry up the tax base in
ways that might make it difficult to replace because of the political
stickiness of tax rates for both individuals and corporations.
Another problem on the supply side involves uncertainty about
whether legislators really have an incentive to prefer higher tax revenues
over a higher number of incorporated firms. There may in fact be an
inverse correlation between revenue and the number of charters, and the
marginal legislator might sensibly prefer to have more companies
chartered in Delaware than to maximize the treasury (or minimize other
tax burdens). Maximizing the number of firms may mean more work for
lawyers, judges, and other service providers in Delaware, and thus
increase campaign contributions to and the prestige of legislators
responsible for attracting firms to the state. The public choice
calculations about what legislators maximize is far from clear, and not
obviously pointed in the direction of “better” firm governance, even in a
world of increased monetary incentives for the state as a whole.
B.
Professor Barzuza’s account also leaves managers out of the
legislative process, and thus overestimates the potential impact that
increased revenues will have on overall legislative incentives. Professor
Barzuza notes that managers are powerful players in the current
legislative process (in fact, strong enough to distort it in perverse
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ways), 6 but then underestimates the role they will have in objecting to
any legislation that, while designed to increase shareholder value, may
destroy manager value. This is especially odd, since the argument for the
tax change is premised on how powerful managers are. Why would this
power to influence legislators wane under a new tax regime?
Presumably the answer is because the legislators now have a larger
incentive (because of the increased tax revenues) to resist the managers.
But one must compare the relative impact of the new tax revenues and
the power of managers in the new world, and it is not at all clear that the
new incentives will be anywhere near strong enough to make a
difference. If the ability of managers to resist improvements in the law
that would increase shareholder value is as significant as Professor
Barzuza believes, taxes are unlikely to do anything to change the
situation. To see this, consider a simple example.
Imagine that the Delaware legislature is considering a bill that would
require firms to destagger their boards. Professor Barzuza cites evidence
suggesting that this would increase shareholder value by $40 billion. We
must consider the gains to legislators from both passage and defeat of
particular legislation. If the bill is passed, Delaware’s treasury will
receive $40 billion multiplied by some tax rate, T. Legislators who vote
for the bill will benefit derivatively from this, receiving some benefit, B,
for increasing state revenues. B is, by definition, less than $40 billion
times T, because the gains are divided up among many legislators, there
exists some question about which legislators get “credit” for bills, and
the money is flowing to the state (and the people) instead of directly to
the legislators themselves.
Managers will try to influence legislators too, by delivering
benefits—call them B*—to individual legislators. We can measure the
upper bound of this influence by estimating the value managers would
have from maintaining the status quo. Professor Barzuza claims that
firms, acting through managers, do not have incentives to destagger their
own boards, because managers prefer the private benefits of control,
which would be diminished if the board were destaggered. To put a
dollar amount on these private benefits one need only estimate the dollar
gains managers would share with shareholders if the board were
destaggered. Assuming managers own, on average, 5% of firm shares,
the managers would gain about $2 billion from the change ($40 billion x
6

See Barzuza, supra note 2, at 538–41.
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5%), and thus the private benefits of control must exceed that amount.
This means managers would be willing to pay over $2 billion to avoid
the legal change; this is the upper limit of B*.
To determine whether legislators will have incentives to pass
shareholder-friendly legislation, we simply compare B* to B. B* is likely
to be much greater than B for an individual legislator, if for no reason
other than the fact that B* is a direct benefit whereas B is, in most cases,
an indirect one. In fact, the direct nature of the benefit for legislators
may be one reason why managers are currently able to exert a
disproportionate influence on legislators compared with diffuse (and
generally disinterested) shareholders.
This approach also allows us to estimate the tax rate necessary for B
to exceed B*. As noted above, the managers would be willing to “pay”
$2 billion to legislators to avoid this law to preserve their private
benefits of control. 7 In the extreme, this means that the tax rate, T,
would have to exceed 5% for legislators to favor the bill. This would be
an absurdly large percentage of firm value to demand in taxes, and one
unlikely to be politically feasible.
II.
Second, even assuming that these issues are solved, there remains the
question of how realistic it is for legislators to make judgments about
what does and does not increase shareholder value. At some level, this is
what legislators are supposed to do, but Delaware’s corporate code is
remarkably devoid of governance dictates, and its legislators have little
experience in this policymaking area. The conceit of the current code is
to leave it to the parties to contract from a bare base to those changes
that will improve value. Although the supposition that parties will
actually bargain or have incentives to strike efficient deals may be
questioned, it is not at all clear that legislative incentives are the
problem. After all, how are legislators to measure the merits of various
academic studies suggesting governance improvements? The literature is
rife with claims that doing X, Y, or Z will improve shareholder value,
but also counterclaims on the merits or on theoretical grounds. Empirical
7

Managers would likely pay, through campaign contributions, lobbying, charitable
donations, or other means, to defeat the bill. Campaign finance laws are obviously relevant
here, but managers can use a variety of mechanisms to deliver B* to legislators, including
ones clearly outside of the reach of even the toughest election laws.
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scholarship is increasingly impenetrable by non-specialists, and, in the
event of hearings on the merits of X, Y, or Z, we can be confident that
there will be as many adamant pros as cons, and even more estimates on
the potential impact on firm value.
In addition, there is no way for legislative judgments about the impact
of X, Y, or Z to be evaluated ex post, since numerous other variables,
like general economic conditions, competition in the industry, and other
regulations, may impact firm profitability. This means that there will be
no (or very noisy) feedback on the efficacy of governance changes and
the merits of the proportional tax scheme. This may undermine the
political support for the tax or for particular governance changes, since
causation will be so uncertain.
These problems simply raise the question of why legislators should
prefer making these judgments, instead of leaving them to firm owners
and managers. It is unlikely that the sum of decision costs and error
costs is less for legislators and courts than for managers and
shareholders. Legislators simply have no experience with this kind of
analysis, as shown by the history of corporate legislation in Delaware.
Moving to a new paradigm where legislators make governance choices
will require overcoming this deficiency in skills and information, as well
as the inertia of the current system. This means that the incentives,
especially at the beginning of the new regime, will have to be much
higher than would be necessary in equilibrium. As a result, the political
resistance to getting such a plan started may be greater than one would
think if one were simply evaluating the steady-state case, and a new
regime less likely to emerge than it would be if Delaware legislators
routinely made corporate governance calculations.
Unlike legislators, firm stakeholders are betting their own money,
careers, and reputations, and are likely to know the idiosyncratic
circumstances of their firms. Firm-specific changes in governance are
more likely to be narrowly tailored to firm and/or industry
circumstances, are more likely to be capable of ex post analysis and
reconciliation, and are more responsive to market forces that will weed
out good from bad governance choices. In addition, the firm may be the
only sensible locus of judging governance. Studies showing that certain
governance changes (for example, smaller boards or separating the chair
and CEO roles) will increase firm value may be biased by omitting
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unobservable variables at a firm level, 8 and therefore may be yielding
false results or ones that are not generalizable across all firms.
In light of these problems, delegating this job to legislators seems
sensible only if the other mechanisms for enacting governance changes
that will increase firm value (while not doing other harms) are
irreparably broken. Instead of giving the power to legislators, who know
less than managers, shareholders, and creditors, why not advocate
repealing the Williams Act, changing the rules about how firms repay
costs in proxy battles, or instituting any number of other reforms that
would keep the burden on firm stakeholders to make these decisions?
III.
Professor Barzuza’s insight makes an important contribution to how
we think about the interplay between taxes and regulation, and what we
view as the most appropriate ways to optimize corporate default rules.
The changes she envisions are unlikely to overcome the managerial
power she presupposes, however, and in any event are a clear second
best to a world of few mandatory rules and robust freedom of contract.
Focusing on improving mechanisms of private ordering, rather than
getting caught in legislative battles, seems to be a more sensible method
of improving corporate governance.

8
See, e.g., Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an
Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature (June 15, 2000),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=233111 (arguing that governance is endogenous and
studies claiming causal links between performance and governance are plagued by
unobserved variables).

